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Editors’ introduction 
In this first instalment of our Soundings series on critical terms, we look at the idea of 
‘generation’, a term which has become highly prevalent within political discourse 
since the financial crisis.1 As with all the concepts in this series, the idea of generation 
is differently mobilised by different political actors. Right-wing thinkers use 
generation in a sense that can be traced back to Edmund Burke to mean the 
transmission of property and culture through time, while other commentators draw on 
meanings derived from Mannheim to refer to the experiences of particular cohorts at 
times of rapid political change. For activists on the left, it is important to distinguish 
between these different connotations of generation. The Burkean approach has 
regressive implications, for example in the justification of austerity as a way of 
protecting future generations from debt; and the Mannheimian understanding, 
although not as conservative, needs to be connected to an intersectional analysis that 
looks at other identity markers alongside those of age - such as class, race, gender and 
sexuality - so as to avoid flattening differences within cohorts and impeding 
solidarities between generations. 
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Generation is a pivotal and structuring concept in contemporary politics, but not 
enough attention is paid to the way in which it operates. We aim here to outline some 
of the key questions a consideration of generation raises and can help illuminate, in 
the belief that it is a concept than opens a vital space both for challenging dominant 
paradigms and contributing to radical thought.  
 
In mainstream political culture one of the most frequently recurring - and loaded - 
media archetypes is the battle between Baby Boomers and Millennials, who tussle in 
the homes and streets of Britain, pitching tuition fees against triple-locked pensions 
and free bus passes against impossible house prices. These stories have intensified 
since the financial crash, partly because it has had differential economic effects on 
specific age cohorts, but cultural differences centred on generation have also played a 
significant role.  
 
This contemporary discourse is a recent manifestation of a recurring social theme that 
was most famously theorised by German sociologist Karl Mannheim in the 1920s.2 
Mannheim argued that generations are distinct social units formed by the historical, 
cultural and technological changes that occur at key times in people’s lives. Since we 
live in a time of crisis and change, Mannheim helps to explain why generation is 
currently emerging as a topic of debate, but it does not explain why the media 
narrative of recent years has mostly focused on age-based inequality. Ben (and others) 
have argued elsewhere that its use in this context opens up insights into what it is like 
to grow up under neoliberalism, even if what comes through most often is a stylised 
conflict between generations.3 
 
The world of Karl Mannheim was shaped by the changes wrought in German culture 
by the First World War. Eighteenth-century philosopher and Whig politician Edmund 
Burke, on the other hand, was writing in the wake of the French revolution - and 
seeking to reassert the old ways. Burke’s understanding of generation is markedly 
different from that of Mannheim. It revolves around the idea of a natural order rather 
than theorising historical change: society was a contract between the generations. This 
difference explains Burke’s appeal to conservatives. While Mannheim looked to 
explain periods of cultural change and the influence of new dynamic forces in rigid 
societies, Burke’s perspective was focused on renewing tradition by linking the past 
to the future through the present, putting an emphasis on continuity rather than 
change.  
 
At the heart of the 2017 Tory manifesto was a depiction of the social contract derived 
from Burke:  
a partnership between those who are living, those who have lived before us, 
and those who are yet to be born.4 
 
During the election Theresa May’s references to generation in her awkward election 
stump speeches should not therefore be understood as part of a pitch dreamed up by 
election spin doctors: she was using the term in way that reflected an ideological 
position within a long tradition. (It should be noted, however, that, while Burke is 
often seen as a founding father of conservatism, his establishment of the basic 
principle of generational social contract is one that also appeals to liberals and 
environmentalists.) 
 
This division of schools of thought on generation - theories of continuity contrasted to 
theories of change - has also framed scholarly understandings. Many commentators 
have pointed to two distinct approaches: on the one hand there is the biological or 
familial understanding of generation (lineage, family trees and so on can be seen 
through this perspective); on the other hand it can be understood dynamically, as a 
social and historical term, and this means that it can be a signifier of social rupture 
and cultural difference between generations.  
 
Generation and common sense 
While academics may seek to separate out these two understandings, common-sense 
discourse makes no such explicit division. People usually engage with the idea at both 
the social and familial levels without distinction. Indeed, what marks generation’s 
explanatory power in dominant discourses is precisely its ability to obscure those 
differences. In seeking in this essay to unpack some of ways in which ideas of 
generation work to shore up a conservative world-view, we hope to make a 
contribution to a deeper understanding of the role of common-sense in sustaining the 
political order - and of the central importance of challenging it. 
 
In some ways, generation has worked as a magic word, the ‘open sesame’ of 
patriarchal philosophy, present everywhere and understood familially, crossed-
through with power and contradiction but framed as a natural phenomenon. And, 
inasmuch as it takes the predominantly white middle-class experience of generation as 
universal, it is closely connected to chauvinist discourses of race, class and sexuality.
  
Indeed, generation tends to be deployed as an effective way of re-orientating 
longstanding struggles around class, gender, place and sexuality, through directing 
attention away from fault-lines based on historical and social division and instead 
locating division in internal disagreement, on the basis of age, within movements, 
groups and the wider society.  
 Thus, while generation can be indicative of new forms within a shifting conjuncture, 
it also has the power to obfuscate processes of oppression. It can be productive if it is 
carefully used in alliance with, rather than opposition to, existing understandings of 
cultural politics, but its powerful symbolism can also be used to disorientate.  
 
In the following sections we look at two key ways in which generation operates, 
firstly through its connection to ideas about the family and property, and secondly 
through its connection to ideas about history and time. 
 
Family and property 
The Burkean generational contract binds together property and patriarchy. Its logic 
thus appealed to the emerging bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century as well as the 
established aristocracy of the period. Today it can bring together a new potential 
alliance of property-owners - everyone who has received (or will receive) an 
inheritance that could become the foundation for a livelihood (i.e. everyone who is 
not reliant solely on wages, including most home-owners). The question of 
inheritance and property is thus a key theme of generational discourse. 
 
Burke’s legacy has fed into some of the organisations, think tanks and debates that 
have grown up as generation has become more central to debate. The 
Intergenerational Commission was set up by David Willetts’s Resolution Foundation 
to: ‘fix the contract between generations that underpins our society’. This 
Commission competes for space in policy-makers’ inboxes and media columns with 
the more established, more Mannheimian, but less well connected Intergenerational 
Foundation, which exists to promote: ‘sustainable long-term policies that are fair to 
all generations - the old, the young and those to come’. 
  
In these debates, an older conservatism is resurfacing that stands in an uneasy 
relationship with the Thatcherite neoliberalism that has for so many years dominated 
the Conservative Party. This partly manifests itself as anxiety about the future: 
neoliberalism has very short temporal horizons - the annual budget, the quarterly 
report, the rapid movement of markets (even if its core strategists took the long view 
in their assault on social democracy); in contrast to this the Burkean conservative asks 
for due care for the future and respect for the past. Moral panics about feckless youth, 
fear of the degradation of traditional social values and more recent concerns about the 
young being less materially comfortable than their parents - all these fit into a 
worldview that can be easily articulated to Burke’s social contract: what is being 
passed on culturally, politically, materially? Will the young be suitable heirs? How 
can they be raised to honour the contract with past generations?  
 
A neoliberal focus on individual acquisition does not easily find answers to these 
questions. Yet it is not truly incompatible with Burke. By ‘preserving the method of 
nature in the conduct of the state’, Burke sought to link the idea of the family with 
that of the church and the state: 
 
In this choice of inheritance we have given our frame of polity the image of a 
relation of blood; binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest 
domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family 
affections; keeping inseparable and cherishing the warmth of all their 
combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our 
sepulchres and our altars.5  
 
It is not too much of step for the modern conservative to add the market to this list of 
combined and mutually reflected charities (perhaps, in part, in place of ‘sepulchres 
and altars’). This then makes available a space on which these contradictions can be 
held together, if not resolved. For neoliberal guru Milton Friedman, the basic 
productive unit was the ‘family’ or household, and he saw it as a natural right for 
children to inherit the accumulated wealth of their fathers.6 In this Friedman was 
arguing for freedom within capitalism, not for a generational social contract; but in 
seeing the family as a unit that operated in the market, he linked the market to the 
‘relation of blood’. Thatcher famously made a similar point when she argued that 
there was no such thing as society, just individual men and women and families. It is 
this valorisation of the family and its endurance through generations that makes 
possible a link between neoliberal economics and social-contract conservatism - the 
family plays a central role in reflecting and reproducing the patriarchal order in both 
these political ideologies.  
 
For the way the family and its reproduction is imagined in contemporary conservative 
political culture tends to the traditional and the patriarchal. The ghost of Aristotle, for 
whom the ultimate purpose of man was to make more men - ‘it takes a man to make a 
man’, or, as some translate it: ‘it takes a man to generate a man’ - still lingers.7 And 
patriarchy is taken for granted in the traditional Christian account of social 
reproduction. The old testament is full of ‘x begat y’ and the importance of patrilineal 
authority, and this theme continues in the new. Thomas Aquinas, discussing Aristotle, 
states: ‘In human generation, the mother provides the matter of the body which, 
however, is still unformed, and receives its form only by means of the power which is 
contained in the father’s seed’.8 Throughout its long conceptual history (necessarily 
much condensed here) there has been a ‘natural’ rather than ‘cultural’ approach to 
generation: there has always been the idea that there is a biological order to things, 
that the links between family, social reproduction and the organisation of society are 
somehow pre-ordained and enduring. 
 
Because of this long history - internalised in our shared cultural wisdom - mainstream 
‘generationalism’ is able to operate as an unquestioned public discourse, and this has 
powerful and exclusionary effects.9 How can you participate in a generational politics 
that centres patrilineal logics if you are not involved (for whatever reason) in 
biological reproduction - or, if you are involved, are operating outside 
heteronormative understandings of family? How can you identify with an 
understanding of history that emphasises a smooth progress from one generation to 
another if you are a new participant in a society, particularly if you have been brought 
there under circumstances of distress, or if your ancestors were slaves and the legacy 
of that history persists? How can you conceptualise that progress if it simply doesn’t 
reach your social and/or economic location, or if your relative socio-economic status 
was in crisis and retreat long before the financial crash - as is the case for many 
established working-class communities? Mainstream generational discourses are able 
to capture people in these kinds of subject positions and draw them consensually into 
the dominant logics; and in doing so they maintain subordination - a difference from 
the norm can never be completely overcome.  
 
Transmitting knowledge and expertise about politics down the generations is not an 
incidental aspect of right-wing political practice: it is the very foundation of the 
conservative emphasis on tradition, and it enables an extremely effective praxis. 
There is an intrinsic advantage in the language of generation because it enables strong 
links to be made between the family and government. This provides conservatism 
with a moral rhetoric, and a way of justifying policy programmes, that resonates with 
something that people from all backgrounds hold most dear: their family. It invites 
families to think of the consequences if ‘the credit card is maxed out’, as a way of 
justifying neoliberalism, or places a moral emphasis on not leaving debt to the next 
generation to justify austerity. This is a politics which enables many core assertions to 
be glossed over, unexamined, as ‘natural’ common sense: it locates family, household 
and the intimate sphere in a temporal politics that is identifiable and recognisable. 
 
History and social change  
Interest in the concept of generation has tended to go through cycles, marking the 
periods in which change is felt to be occurring rapidly. It often presages or follows 
what we might call a conjunctural shift: these upsurges of interest in generation and 
generations can be mapped, albeit unevenly, onto moments of major change in 
society.  
 
For Mannheim, generation was a way of signifying and understanding major social 
and cultural change. In seeking to understand how generation, like class conflict, 
could be a driver of history, he proposed that, as young people come of age they make 
‘fresh contact’ with their surrounding culture, and this shapes their political views for 
life. The degree of significance of this process for a given period of politics depends 
on the scale and intensity of change taking place in society - economically, politically, 
culturally. He saw the emergence of highly politicised youth groups in 1920s 
Germany as representing a break with the socio-cultural and political norms of the 
pre-war era and setting the tone for the free-wheeling liberalism of the Weimar 
Republic.  
 
It was the age cohort born after the Second World War that prompted American 
scholars to begin to explore the concept: the explosion of the counter-culture in the 
1960s marked another burst of writing on the subject. Douglas Coupland, perhaps 
literature’s most famous invoker of generation, then took up the baton in the 1990s, 
painting the youth culture of the period in the slackadaisical tropes of Generation X, 
who were said to be drifting aimlessly in the seeming post-political vacuum after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. Meanwhile recent interest in Millennials is configured (in the 
Anglophone world at least) by the politico-cultural milieu of a post-financial crash 
society and the rise of digital media.10 
 
In all these cases, a change in society was seen as being expressed in a difference of 
attitudes between generations. History could be at least partly understood as a story of 
generational succession. 
 
Writing at a time of renewed interest in the term in the 1970s, classicist Laura Nash 
saw generation as a central concept in the myths of the Ancient Greeks:  
 
Generation, then, is the reference point, in ancient usage as well as today, for a 
multitude of concepts, a very metaphor for existence. Like the verb to be, 
generation requires an adjective of context, a predicate of relativity, before it 
takes on meaning. Used sometimes with complacency (‘my generation’), 
sometimes with belligerence (‘your generation’) … generation marks 
allegiance, time of life, span of years, sameness with one group and otherness 
from the rest.11  
 
Sociologist Judith Burnett suggests that for the Greeks, generation was a form of 
mythical periodisation that expressed and indicated the passage of time and change: it 
provided ‘boundary markers’ that enabled the distinguishing of ‘kinds of people’ who 
lived in ‘kinds of time’. Their conception of generation was figurative, attributing 
specific properties to people belonging to different eras: generations were ‘endowed 
with properties (youthful, weak, heroic, fast) … regarded as portents of what is to 
come or blamed for events which occurred, the genealogy of which can be traced 
back to them’.12  
 
Burnett contrasts the modern conception of generation to that of the Greeks, based as 
it was on mythological rather than humanistic conceptions of time. But the 
mythological account gives an insight into the ways in which media uses of the term 
work at a commonsense level, and we believe it is worth dwelling on this.13 In Greek 
myths lineage marked the heroes as children of the gods, endowed with the flaws and 
virtues appropriate to their generational location. Contemporary generational myths 
often follow similar patterns: the heroic capacity of Heracles, the son of Zeus, resulted 
from his divine lineage, and so too did his troubles, passed on by his father’s reckless 
behaviour; the Millennial son of the Baby Boomer is gifted a world of technology and 
wealth, but lacks the navigational tools of his forebears - whether financial or cultural.  
 
While We’re Young (2014), directed by Noah Baumbach, represents a recent attempt 
to make sense of generational difference, in this case in the context of the world of 
documentary filmmaking. But the narrative soon collapses from socio-cultural 
difference into familial relationships. Ben Stiller’s angsty Gen X lead is the son-in-
law of Charles Grodin’s heroic, but difficult, Boomer. Grodin ultimately favours 
Millennial Adam Driver’s narcissistic ‘fresh take’ on documentary making: his 
incorporation of social media and a dubious relationship to truth offers something 
more exciting than Stiller’s reverent approach. The film tries to explore what these 
generational figures say about a shift in social values, but in the end the narrative 
reproduces the familial dynamics of Greek myth - to the extent that the female 
characters primarily exist as plot devices to link one man to another, or as sexual 
conquests.  
 
In locating the narrative conflict within the family, the film decentres the socio-
cultural and economic changes that have accompanied the rise of these generational 
exemplars. It takes historical processes out of the picture, operating in the same way 
and with similar effects to the mythologisation of battles between babyboomers and 
millennials in the media. The movement from one socioeconomic settlement to 
another becomes invisible - and along with it the generational inequality of the new 
settlement.  
 
Revisiting the ancient practice of using mythical archetypes to explore moral 
dilemmas and model behaviour brings to mind more recent writing on myth in 
society, and in particular the work of Roland Barthes. For Barthes, myth was a 
mechanism for transmitting ideological messages: it revealed and obscured in equal 
measure. His classic example from the 1950s, of a magazine-cover image of a young 
black soldier saluting the French flag, plays a similar role to the generational figures 
we have been discussing.14 The image represents an inclusive, post-racial France - 
patriotic, youthful, optimistic and diverse - while masking continuing colonial 
oppression. In the same way, the figures of the Millennial and the Baby Boomer hide 
differences of class, race and gender while also telling us something recognisable 
about changing times. 
 
Political activism and the intergenerational contract 
Generation has a long history in the service of patriarchy and the old order. It 
humanises the link between past, present and future, and makes the complex sweeps 
of time understandable through the medium of family relationships: ancestors, 
grandparents, parents, children and the unborn.  
 
Whether in its Burkean or Mannheimian formulations, it is variously used to justify 
austerity; to lead attacks on welfare for both old and young (separately but similarly); 
and to make the case for a rebalancing of the economy in the hypothesised interests of 
the young/old (what those interests are depends quite clearly on where you sit on the 
political and age spectrum). It is a category of identity that can be effectively 
mobilised for many purposes.  
 
The Tories have been more convincing in their invocation of generation than Labour, 
but Labour has occasionally been successful in ridiculing the right on this terrain. 
Tony Blair’s first speech as leader lampooned Michael Portillo’s claim that free 
markets let wealth ‘cascade from generation to generation’; he counter-argued that 
socialism required different metaphors, such as community, solidarity and 
partnership.15 What these terms eventually came to mean under New Labour is 
another story altogether, but it is worth reflecting here on the effectiveness of this 
language at the time. Ed Miliband’s ‘British Promise’ that ‘the next generation should 
do better than the last’ was much less convincing, wrapped as it was in the language 
and tropes of nationalism, family and a conformist idea of ‘progress’.  
 
Parts of the environmental movement have also attempted to capitalise on the power 
of this generational discourse, positing the rights of future generations to argue for 
effective action on climate change. Hungary is the first state to have an operational 
Ombudsman for Future Generations, and this is seen as a useful means of making a 
moral case about the abstract notion of intergenerational justice, to be considered 
alongside the needs and rights of existing citizens.16 Once again the moral force of the 
family is the pivot: who would want to leave a world devastated by climate change to 
their children and grandchildren? But such uses of generation repeat the problems 
outlined in the arguments above. The future generations are imagined as those of the 
global North, and the language assumes a normative family construction and 
universalises its logics, all the while excluding people in the global south who are 
already experiencing the effects of climate change.17 The structural problems of the 
conservative discourse on generation are just as present in the environmental 
argument. Climate change is one of the most challenging problems of our time, but 
linking it to a fundamentally conservative social understanding of society makes it 
very difficult to articulate the changes that are needed to tackle it. In invoking 
language that explicitly and implicitly reinforces the existing cultural and social 
configurations of capitalism, patriarchy and heteronormativity, it limits the actions 
that can be mobilised.18 
 
The normalisation of patriarchal family formations in these questions of futurity has 
also been criticised by feminist and queer scholars; and here the idea of ‘reproductive 
futurism’, a term coined by Lee Edelman to explain understandings of time (though in 
a different context) may be a helpful aid to understanding. Edelman argues that time 
is structured by the all-pervasive figure of the child in need of protection: it is this 
which represents the possibility of the future: ‘That Child remains the perpetual 
horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political 
intervention’. To ‘submit’ to this politics - and it is one that is used by the left-wing 
environmental movement - is thus to authenticate this social order.19 
 
As we have already noted, generation is seen as a pivot: the movement from the past 
to the present to the future revolves around it. And this sense of generational 
movement through history as a smooth progression lends weight to a wider view of 
history as progress. But many black activists and writers challenge this framing of 
history, arguing that it is important to recognise that the violence of past persists in the 
present. This is especially pertinent when understandings of generation are linked to 
the inheritance of property through the patrilineal line. How does this relate to 
someone whose subjectivity is owned, and whose ownership is legitimated by a 
particular concept of ‘generation’? Dylan Rodriguez argues that America’s ‘racial 
chattel logic’ is still present in the prison system, in which the prisoner is legally 
understood as the bodily property of the state. Racial slavery cannot be positioned in 
the past tense, because ‘slavery shapes our spatial and political present tense’.20 
Hortense Spillers argues that there is an American ‘grammar’ that maintains 
subordination through a language and culture that is ‘grounded in the originating 
metaphors of captivity and mutilation, so that it is as if neither time nor history, nor 
historiography and its topics, shows movement, as the human subject is “murdered” 
over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing 
itself in endless disguise’.21 Science fiction novels by writers such as Octavia Butler 
and Toni Morrison disrupt a linear and progressive understanding of time as a way of 
exposing its investment in white supremacy. Robbie Shilliam invokes the temporal 
sensibilities of Ras Tafari philosophy and the ‘now time’ of reparations: ‘struggles of 
the ancestors must be redeemed because their suffering manifests in the conditions 
presently experienced by their dependants’.22  
 
Thinking generation with intersectionality 
In the light of all this, is it possible to reclaim generation for left-wing and social 
justice groups - and to do so while still being attentive to people who are marginalised 
or excluded by conventional framings of generation? Is it possible to use the concept 
of generation as a political tool without ignoring class, or to talk about time and 
history without excluding those who continue to experience injuries of the past in 
present - and without assuming normative attitudes to reproductive sexualities?  
 
We would argue that it is possible, but it is important in so doing to be aware of the 
complexities and difficulties we have outlined in this essay. In the academic literature, 
the tendency is to refine and clarify the concept. But this can mean that complexity is 
lost. For example, sociologists June Edmunds and Bryan Turner, who wrote 
extensively on generation at the turn of the millennium, offered an alternative master-
narrative for social change in which class was replaced by generation: they argued for 
a generational dialectic whereby active generations change society and passive ones 
then consolidate these changes.23 The political consequences of this position are quite 
obviously negative for the left. On the other hand, youth studies scholars such as 
Daniel Woodman and Johanna Wyn foreground generation as a key sociological area 
for exploration, but are at pains to argue it must be understood in relation to class, 
gender, race and sexuality.24 Neither of these approaches is entirely satisfactory, but 
we have far more sympathy with the latter than the former. 
 
For generation to be a productive concept it needs to be understood within a wider 
conjunctural and intersectional framework. As Kimberlé Crenshaw suggests: 
‘Intersectional dynamics are not static, but neither are they untethered from history, 
context, or social identity.’25 Generation is not an identity in the same way as class, 
race or gender: by definition the Millennial lacks the long histories that those 
established vectors of identity carry with them. We are always located in both a 
specific generational cohort, and a specific age group within our families, but we and 
our generation will pass from youth to age, and, as we do, this will be mapped on to 
specific historical moments. Generation is not an enduring category of person, and it 
is often invoked as a way of mythologising or personifying social change rather than 
as a fixed identity. Other identities also change over time but they have longer 
histories: the working class has a history going back to the industrial revolution; our 
ideas about women are shaped by millennia of patriarchal oppression.  
 
However, when used in specific contexts the idea of generation can work helpfully to 
locate continuity and difference in relation to current activism. For instance, some 
Black Lives Matter activists - for example the Crunk Feminist Collective - locate their 
politics generationally, in relation to but also distinct from previous black feminist 
and black liberation movements. The idea of generation allows present-day activists 
to define themselves in continuity with, but also as different from, past generations of 
activists, including the civil rights movement generation, in relation to issues such as 
theory, tactics and strategy. This is not a question of continuity being seen as a line 
passing from father to son, or even from pre- to post- liberation. It is seen, rather, in 
shifts in approach: for example from one based on performative respectability to one 
immersed in hip hop vitality; or from one based on a male leadership bound up with 
religious authority to one of queer feminist inclusivity. For activists involved in BLM, 
generation locates a political movement in the legacy of previous struggle but it does 
this in order to challenge white supremacist capitalist patriarchy.26  
 
When using the concept of generation we need to be attentive to specific contexts in 
which it is being used, and be wary of the ways that the term can be used to gloss over 
difference. Generation can be an explanatory tool only if it is understood as 
intersecting with other axes of difference and inequality, such as class, gender, race, 
sexuality, place, ability. Generational identity is located differently from these other 
categories, given its different temporal framing, but, as long as it is understood in 
conjunction with an intersectional analysis, it can enrich and inform actions taken in 
the present. For inheritance is not just about property and status, it can also be about 
inspiration, knowledge and a deep well of emotional support.  
 
In conclusion, and going back to the 2017 UK election with which we started this 
article, generation - located by the vector of age - can be seen to have played an 
important part in galvanising enthusiasm for Labour’s 2017 election manifesto, as 
people who were previously alienated from politics became enthused by a genuine 
alternative. That people across ages and locations in the lifecycle are being re-
enfranchised is exciting. Nevertheless, this new chapter in Labour’s history is only 
going to be successful and genuinely socially-democratic if, as well as continuing to 
address young people as legitimate voters, it ensures that its policies and ideologies 
reach beyond patriarchal understandings of generation (whether based on Burke or 
Mannheim). A narrative based on generational conflict always carries the risk of 
diverting attention from deeper and more entrenched forms of inequality.  
 
Thanks to Deborah Grayson for her help in formulating the ideas presented here. All 
errors are our own! 
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